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1. Introduction 
  Are markets and governments substitutes or complements? Traditional left-
right ideological divisions notwithstanding, an important strand of thought has always 
maintained that markets and governments are, in fact, complementary. The argument 
is that governments can help produce the political support required to maintain 
flexible markets by providing social insurance policies, by stabilising the aggregate 
level of economic activity, or by otherwise reducing the risk of disruption which 
markets on their own can represent. A classic statement of this view is provided by 
Ruggie (1982), who argues that in the aftermath of the catastrophe that was the 
interwar period, policy makers developed a series of domestic and international 
institutions which sought to combine a multilateral commitment to free trade, on the 
one hand, with domestic stability on the other. This historic compromise he termed 
‘embedded liberalism.’  Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt (2005, pp. 473-4) summarize the 
argument nicely: “Because trade causes economic dislocations and exposes workers 
to greater risk, it generates political opposition that democratically elected leaders 
ignore at their peril. Thus...political leaders have had to be aware of and actively 
manage public support for economic openness. To do this, governments have 
exchanged welfare state policies that cushion their citizens from the vagaries of the 
international economy in return for public support for openness.”  
   Similarly, Rodrik (1998) shows that more open countries have bigger 
governments, and explains this correlation in two stages. First, he argues that “More 
open economies have greater exposure to the risks emanating from turbulence in 
world markets” (p. 1011). Second, he argues that government expenditure can 
perform “an insulation function, insofar as the government sector is the “safe” sector 
(in terms of employment and purchases from the rest of the economy) relative to other   2
activities, and especially compared to tradables” (ibid.). Governments may also 
directly reduce the risk facing individuals by providing safety nets, and Rodrik argues 
that this is indeed the case in richer countries. But, in either case, government 
expenditure has the same effect: it reduces risk, and since risk increases with 
openness, political considerations ensure that the size of the government expands with 
openness as well. 
  This paper tests the micro-foundations of these hypotheses, and it does so in 
two stages. First, if risk increases with openness, then risk-averse individuals should 
be opposed to openness, and thus favour policies, such as tariffs or quotas, which limit 
the extent to which the national economy interacts with the rest of the world. Second, 
government expenditure should be effective in reducing the hostility of such voters 
towards openness: that is, in countries with bigger governments, risk-averse voters 
should be less hostile to globalization than they would be in countries where 
governments are small. Testing the first hypothesis requires information not only on 
individual attitudes towards trade, but on their attitudes towards risk as well. Testing 
the second hypothesis obviously requires survey data for several countries, 
characterised by a range of government sizes. 
  In testing these hypotheses, we need to control for the fact that preferences 
towards trade are determined by a range of other variables as well. There is already a 
substantial literature, for example, which argues that trade affects voter attitudes 
through its effects on labour markets, and that these effects are consistent with the 
predictions of simple Heckscher-Ohlin trade models (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001). This paper will control for 
these Heckscher-Ohlin effects and confirm the results of the previous studies using a 
newly available data set, the Asia-Europe Survey (ASES), which covers nine East and   3
South East Asian and nine Western European countries. The paper will also take 
seriously the possibility that a range of non-economic factors may shape preferences 
towards globalization. In this paper we focus on the concept of national identity as a 
more fundamental measure of nationalism than the specific measures of  ‘patriotism’ 
and ‘chauvinism’ that we have considered elsewhere (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; 
O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001).  In addition to this, we also look at whether supra-
national identity (i.e., a feeling of being European or Islamic or Asian or Chinese) can 
have an influence on voter preferences. We return to the question of the expectations 
one might have regarding the impact of these variables below. 
  Against this background, the primary focus of the paper is on the role that 
governments can play in shaping attitudes towards globalization. In this regard, it is 
closely related to a number of recent papers that argue that public finance 
considerations can shape such attitudes (Facchini and Mayda 2006, Hanson 2005, 
Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2005). The dominant expectation in this literature is 
that the existence of the welfare state, itself a consequence of Ruggie’s embedded 
liberalism, will influence attitudes towards immigration but not towards trade since 
“immigrants may pay taxes, may receive public services, and may vote over tax and 
spending choices. Imports, obviously, do none of these things” (Hanson, Scheve and 
Slaughter 2005, p. 1). By contrast, the risk channel considered here is one which 
should operate on trade preferences. 
 
2. Trade preferences: labour markets, redistribution, risk and identity 
  The study of economic factors affecting responses to globalization typically 
focuses on the income-distribution effects of international integration. Assuming self-
interested maximizing behaviour, attitudinal responses in survey data sets reflect the   4
impact of globalization on each respondent's individual utility. Therefore the analysis 
of preferences, combined with information on each individual's socio-economic 
background, allows an indirect test of the income-distribution predictions of standard 
economic models. In addition, the availability in survey data sets of questions on 
values, national identity and other attachments makes it possible to investigate how 
globalization is perceived at the individual level from a non-economic point of view. 
  The income-distribution effects of trade occur through different channels. The 
first set of papers in the existing literature focuses on the labour-market competition 
hypothesis. Trade allows countries to indirectly exchange the services of factors of 
production, and thus affects rates of return in factor markets. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
model predicts that trade liberalization benefits abundant factors and hurts scarce 
factors. If skilled and unskilled labour are the two inputs into production, then in skill-
abundant countries skilled workers should favour trade liberalization while unskilled 
workers should oppose it. In other words, we should observe a positive correlation 
between the level of individual skill and pro-trade attitudes in these countries. Scheve 
and Slaughter (2001) find empirical evidence which is consistent with this prediction 
in their analysis of U.S. trade preferences. The trade model also predicts that, in skill-
scarce countries, the more educated an individual is, the smaller the probability that 
he or she is in favour of free trade. This implies that, in skill-scarce countries, we 
should observe a negative correlation between individual skill and pro-trade 
preferences. O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) show that 
these predicted relationships between individual skill and attitudes are consistent with 
cross-national survey data. Skilled workers welcome trade liberalization only if they 
are in skill-abundant countries while, in skill-scarce countries, it is the less educated 
who are stronger promoters of free trade. In this paper we use a newly available data   5
set, that covers a different range of countries than our previous papers, and test the 
robustness of the above results by controlling for these labour-market determinants of 
preferences. 
  Another strand of the literature on preferences emphasizes that, together with 
the labour market, there is an additional economic channel through which individual 
utilities are affected by globalization, namely the welfare state, though there are 
important differences between trade and migration in this respect. Since immigrants 
both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state, they are likely to have a non-
negligible impact on public finances, even though their net effect could be negative or 
positive, depending for example on their skill mix relative to natives. Hanson, Scheve 
and Slaughter (2005), Hanson (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006) all find 
evidence that individual attitudes towards immigration are indeed influenced by this 
welfare state channel. However, Hanson et al. point out that the impact of trade on the 
welfare state is much smaller than the effect of immigration, especially in developed 
countries. Even though trade liberalization reduces tariff revenues, the trade 
component of government revenues is usually small in high-income countries. In 
addition, while trade increases the cost of the welfare state if public programs are in 
place, such as Trade Adjustment Assistance in the U.S., this effect is usually limited 
in size. Based on U.S. survey evidence, Hanson et al. find that while welfare state 
considerations play an important role in shaping individual attitudes towards 
immigration, they play no role in shaping individual attitudes towards trade. In 
particular, in American states with high numbers of immigrants and relatively 
generous welfare systems, high-skill respondents are much less favourably disposed 
to immigration than they would be in states with low fiscal exposure to immigration, 
the interpretation being that high-skill workers are high earners and will thus object to   6
immigration in their capacity as taxpayers. On the other hand, they find that state 
welfare spending has no effect on attitudes towards trade. 
  As pointed out in the previous section, in this paper we focus on the channel 
examined by Rodrik (1998), and analyze both the impact of risk considerations on 
individual protectionist attitudes, and the role of the government in shaping this link. 
Two papers in the literature (Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt 2005, Scheve and Slaughter 
2004) come closest to analyzing the risk channel we are interested in, although neither 
in our view provides a direct test of our hypotheses. Scheve and Slaughter (2004) 
carry out a country-level analysis that shows how opposition to economic integration - 
analyzed as the dependent variable – is negatively affected by welfare policies. First 
the authors relate country-level average trade opinions to macroeconomic conditions 
(such as the unemployment rate), labour-market policies and institutions.
2 They find 
that protectionist opinion is a significantly increasing function of the unemployment 
rate: however, controlling for the latter variable, the average opposition to free trade is 
negatively affected by labour spending (total national spending on labour market 
programs as a percentage of GDP) and by measures of employment protection. They 
also show that the gap in protectionist attitudes between unskilled and skilled workers 
- which is greater the more skill-abundant the country is - is attenuated by the size of 
the welfare state (labour spending).
3 Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt (2005) show that 
support for free trade is positively correlated with the net replacement rate for 
unemployment insurance, with the amount of government spending per unemployed 
worker on active labour market programs, and with a subjective evaluation of the 
social security system (the first and third measures vary at the individual level, while 
                                     
2 For data on attitudes, they use the ISSP survey and, for robustness checks, the WVS. 
3 In particular, in Figure 4 Scheve and Slaughter (2004) plot the marginal effect of individual skill on 
protectionist attitudes – from country-specific regressions – against spending on labour-market 
programs as a percent of GDP, controlling for (log) per capita GDP. The figure shows that the 
regression coefficient on labour spending is positive and significant.   7
the second one is a country-level variable).
4 Our paper differs from Scheve and 
Slaughter (2004) in that ours is an individual-level analysis while theirs is mostly a 
country-level one; it differs from Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt (2005) in that the 
survey which we use allows us to explicitly relate risk attitudes to preferences towards 
globalization. In addition, we test whether this impact of risk preferences on attitudes 
towards trade is influenced by government policy. We are thus testing more directly 
the micro-foundations of Rodrik’s thesis.  
  As already noted, we are also interested in the non-economic determinants of 
globalization preferences. Several of the previous papers cited found that interests 
were not the only determinants of protectionist policy preferences. Nationalist 
ideology also mattered, and, by implication, national identity. Our objective in this 
paper is to go two steps further. The first step is to use a direct measure of national 
identity as opposed to our previous specific measures of patriotism and chauvinism. 
Second, we include the effects of supranational identity in the analysis. In the 
European context, the reasons for including supranational identity are obvious, 
although a priori it is not clear which way the effect should go: respondents who say 
they have a sense of European identity might be more outward-looking, supporting 
intra-European liberalization and, by extension, supporting globalization more 
generally. Or, they might have a mercantilist desire to liberalize within Europe, but 
maintain high barriers between Europe and the rest of the world, a strategy pursued by 
many nascent European nation states during the early modern period, as Heckscher’s 
classic study of mercantilism emphasizes (Heckscher 1935). Note also that in this 
paper we look not just at the effects of European supranational identity, but at the 
                                     
4 The authors also mention a robustness check where they interact measures of individual trade 
exposure with the social protection variables. Employment in import competing sectors of the economy 
has a negative impact on support for trade. However, the size of this effect decreases as the level of 
social protection increases.   8
effects of Asian, Chinese and Islamic identities as well, although these are clearly 
very different in nature from a sense of European identity. Expectations regarding the 
effects of these identities are even more difficult to pin down a priori. One might 
regard Asian identity as being analogous to European identity in that it has a specific 
supranational institutional underpinning, through ASEAN. On the other hand, this 
institutional underpinning is clearly much weaker, lacking the sophisticated political 
machinery of the EU, let alone any notion of a shared citizenship. Whether a sense of 
Asian identity is likely to be associated with negative or with positive views about 
globalization is thus, if anything, more difficult to decide than is the parallel question 
in the European case. In the case of Islamic identity, its religious underpinning might 
suggest an association with universal values and with support for openness; on the 
other hand, the growing politicization of Islamic identity in recent years may imply an 
association with resistance to globalization. Finally, the difficulty in the case of 
Chinese supranational identity lies in separating the effects of the supranational 
dimension from the effects of its ethnic and national foundations. It might be expected 
that the overseas Chinese community would be pro-globalization, given the role of 
ethnic Chinese networks in promoting trade (Rauch and Trindade 2002), but this is 
merely supposition.  In short, while there are very good reasons for attempting to 
tease out the impact of a range of supranational identities, it is difficult to embark on 
the enterprise with clear-cut and well-grounded hypotheses. As a result, all we do here 
is to explore the issues by noting the empirical findings. 
 
3. The data 
  This paper draws on data from the Asia-Europe Survey (ASES), which is a 
survey of political culture in nine East and South East Asian and nine Western   9
European countries. The survey was conducted in autumn 2000 by Gallup 
International and its local affiliates and was coordinated by Nippon Research Centre, 
Tokyo
5. Minimum sample size in each country was 1000 respondents. With two 
exceptions, the target population consisted of all those aged 18-79 in the entire 
country. The exceptions were China, where the target was those aged 18-79 living in 
eight major cities, and Indonesia, where the target was those aged 18-79 living in 
Java. Sampling and fieldwork details are provided in Nippon Research Centre (2001). 
  Our dependent variable is a binary variable indicating respondents’ attitudes 
towards trade. ‘Extremely protectionist’ is equal to one if respondents strongly agreed 
with the statement that their country “should limit the import of foreign products”, 
and zero otherwise. Note that the way that we have defined this variable implies that 
respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ to the questions, or did not answer the 
question at all, are coded as zero: the dummy variable thus simply indicates whether 
or not the respondent gave the most protectionist response possible to the question.
6 
  The ASES survey asks respondents to state their age and gender, as well as the 
number of years of schooling they received. These variables are all included in our 
regressions in a straightforward manner, although we assumed that the maximum 
number of years of schooling an individual might reasonably receive was 25, and 
excluded those individuals reporting a higher number than this (typically, these 
individuals gave their age in response to this question). 
  Our national identity variable was generated as follows. Respondents were 
asked the following question (the example given is the question as asked in Japan): 
                                     
5 The ASES project was supported by a grant from the Japanese Ministry of 
Education and Science (Scientific Research Grant # 11102001, Principal Investigator: Takashi 
Inoguchi). Information regarding ASES, including the questionnaire used, is available at 
http://www.asiaeuropesurvey.org/index.html 
6 Alternatively, we could have coded non-respondents as missing values, but since there are only 4 non-
responses to this question this would have made no difference to our results.   10
“Many people think of themselves as being part of a particular nationality, for 
example as French or American or Japanese or whatever. Do you think of yourself as 
[JAPANESE] or as belonging to another nationality, or do you not think of yourself 
in this way?”  Unless respondents answered that they thought of themselves as 
Japanese, they were coded as zero. If they thought of themselves as Japanese, then 
they were coded as 1 if they answered ‘not important at all’ to the question “Overall, 
how important is it that you are [JAPANESE]”, 2 if they answered ‘only a little 
important,’ 3 if they answered ‘somewhat important’, and 4 if they answered 
‘extremely important’.  
  We also defined four ‘supranational identity’ variables, depending on how 
respondents answered the following question: “Some people also think of themselves 
as being part of a larger group that includes people from other countries, for example, 
as European, Asian, Chinese, Islamic etc. How about you, do you think of yourself in 
this way?’ Respondents could indicate that they thought of themselves as being 
European, Asian, Chinese or Islamic, and four dummy variables corresponding to 
each of these four categories were defined. The excluded categories are the other 
possible answers to the same question: ‘other supranational identity’ and ‘I don't think 
of myself in this way’ (missing values are kept as such and therefore are not included 
in the regressions); the impact of the excluded categories is embodied in the constant. 
  In order to gain an insight into risk aversion and the demand for social 
insurance, we availed of responses to the following question: “Please tell me how 
much you agree or disagree with the following...The government should take 
responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is provided with adequate 
social welfare.” ‘Pro-safety net’ indicates how strongly respondents agreed with this 
statement, on a scale from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). In itself, we   11
believe that this variable indicates a sense of risk-aversion, since it shows whether or 
not respondents want the government to ensure that there is a minimum level of 
welfare below which it will not let people fall. If a taxpayer is in favour of paying for 
such a guarantee, this is certainly consistent with a preference for insurance, and 
hence an aversion to risk. On the other hand, attitudes in favour of the provision of 
such safety nets might reflect individual attributes other than risk-aversion, and we 
want to control for these in the analysis. Once we have controlled for these other 
characteristics, ‘Pro-safety net’ can reasonably be regarded as an indicator of risk 
aversion. 
  What variables other than risk aversion might lead people to favour the 
introduction of safety nets? In order to answer this question, we make use of the 
analysis in Alesina and La Ferrara (2004), who study the determinants of individual 
preferences for redistribution. To be sure, redistribution is not the same thing as the 
provision of minimum safety nets, since redistribution involves taxing the rich to 
benefit the poor, while safety nets might benefit anyone faced with a sufficiently 
negative shock, whether rich or poor. Nonetheless, several of the variables which 
Alesina and La Ferrara identify as mattering for attitudes towards redistribution might 
also reasonably be expected to influence demands for social insurance as well. 
According to Alesina and La Ferrara, preferences towards redistribution should reflect 
current and future income (with richer people, or people expecting to be rich in the 
future, being more opposed to redistribution), risk aversion (with greater risk aversion 
spurring a greater demand for redistribution), altruism (greater altruism leading to a 
greater demand for redistribution), and perceptions about whether the opportunities 
facing different individuals in society are equal or unequal (with people who believe 
that opportunities are unfairly distributed favouring redistribution). Their empirical   12
results lend support to these hypotheses, and suggest that if you take preferences for 
redistribution, and strip away the influences of current and future income and 
ideology (i.e. altruism and beliefs about equality of opportunities), then what you 
should be left with is a measure of risk-aversion. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that if we strip away the impact of current and future income and ideology from our 
safety net variable, what we should be left with is a measure of risk aversion as well. 
This is especially so since our safety net question is closer to risk aversion than their 
redistribution variable to begin with, as it measures a fear of falling below a minimum 
level of welfare, rather than a desire to see the government narrowing the gaps 
between the rich and the poor.  
  Therefore, in what follows we will attempt to control for both current and 
future income and ideology, and are confident that the residual impact of ‘Pro-safety 
net’ can indeed be interpreted as a measure of individual risk-aversion. To this end, 
we introduce three further variables into the analysis. The first is household living 
standards, which vary from 1 (‘low’) to 5 (‘high’) and capture the level of current 
income. The second variable is based on a question asking respondents whether they 
are worried about their work situation – the variable ranges from 1 (‘very worried’) to 
3 (‘not worried at all’) – and could be viewed as a proxy for expectations of future 
income. It should be noted that we also control for the Heckscher-Ohlin variables - 
described below - which capture an important component of future expected income 
changes of the respondent, namely those linked to globalization. The third is a 
measure of political ideology, based on where respondents place themselves on a ten-
point left-right scale. This variable represents a proxy for a sense of altruism and 
beliefs about equality of opportunities. Unfortunately, this question was not asked in   13
China, and thus in regressions involving this variable we were forced to omit all 
Chinese observations. 
  Finally, there are two country-level variables that we introduce in order to test 
our two main economic hypotheses. The first is GDP per capita, which as in our 
previous papers we assume is positively correlated with countries’ relative skill-
abundance and which can thus be used to test the predictions arising out of 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory. In particular, the theory predicts that in poor countries, being 
high-skilled should be associated with anti-trade attitudes, whereas in rich countries it 
should be associated with more liberal attitudes. The prediction is thus that schooling 
should enter with a positive sign in a regression explaining anti-trade sentiment, but 
that an interaction term between schooling and GDP per capita should enter with a 
negative sign. The numbers on GDP per capita are taken from Heston et al. (2002), 
and are for 1998 (the last year for which data for all 18 countries, including Taiwan, 
were given). 
  The second country-level variable is a measure of government size. We use 
the World Development Indicators’ figures for general government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which are for 2000. Our strategy is to interact 
government size with risk aversion; we expect to find that while risk aversion has a 
positive effect on anti-trade sentiment, the interaction term will enter with a negative 
sign in the regressions, indicating that risk-aversion has a weaker effect on anti-
globalization attitudes in countries with larger governments. Unfortunately, data for 
Taiwan are missing, and so we are forced to exclude Taiwan from this analysis.   14
  Summary statistics for all variables are given in Table 1, while Table 2 gives 
the country level means for the variables.
7 Ireland has the smallest government share 
within Europe, while governments are generally smaller in Asia than in Europe. 
Respondents tend to favour safety nets, and to place themselves in the middle of the 
political spectrum. There are particularly strong senses of national identity in 
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Greece.  
 
4. Results 
  Table 3 presents the results of the series of probit regressions designed to test 
the various hypotheses developed in the previous sections. In every case we use the 
same binary dependent variable, ‘Extremely protectionist’.  All equations include 
country fixed effects, to capture the influence of any unobserved country-specific 
factors that might be influencing attitudes in a uniform way across respondents. We 
do not report these country effects in Table 3, although we do report the coefficients 
on the basic demographic controls that we include (that is age and female). As in 
previous work, we find that older people are more opposed to trade. We also find a 
pronounced gender effect, with women being more protectionist than men, other 
things being equal. Since these age and gender effects are not the primary focus of 
this paper, we merely note them at this stage and move on to our main results. 
  As in our previous work (Mayda and Rodrik 2005, O’Rourke and Sinnott 
2001) we find that the data are consistent with the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory (equation 1). The coefficient on schooling is positive and statistically 
significant, while the interaction term between schooling and GDP per capita is 
                                     
7 The summary statistics in the overall sample (Table 1) are based on the observations used in 
regression (7), Table 3, which is our preferred specification. The marginal effects we calculate in 
Section 4 use mean values of the regressors from this Table. The summary statistics by country (Table 
2) are instead based on all the observations available in the dataset (since not all countries in the sample 
are covered in regression (7), Table 3).   15
negative and statistically significant. This implies that in sufficiently poor countries, 
the better educated will be anti-trade, while in sufficiently rich countries, the better 
educated will be liberal in their attitudes towards trade. This result is extremely 
robust, in that it survives the inclusion of many additional variables in the 
specifications in equations (2) through (8).  According to the coefficients reported in 
equation (7) (which is our preferred specification, as it controls for risk considerations 
and non-economic determinants of attitudes) the cut-off point for per capita GDP 
below which the high-skilled are protectionist is approximately $9,500. In addition, 
the coefficient estimates in equation (7) imply that an extra four years of schooling 
increases the probability of an extremely protectionist trade response by 2.2 
percentage points in Indonesia (whose per capita GDP is approximately $3,900) while 
it reduces the probability by 3.2 percentage points in Sweden (whose per capita GDP 
is $22,475).
8 
  Equation (2) moves on to the main theme of our paper, by including our pro-
safety net variable. As we expected, being in favour of government-provided safety 
nets is positively correlated with anti-globalization sentiment, with the result being 
highly statistically significant. We believe that the positive coefficient on ‘Pro-safety 
net’ is in part driven by the impact of risk aversion. However, entering ‘Pro-safety 
net’ on its own is open to the criticism that this variable captures not just risk-
                                     
8 To calculate the marginal effects of individual skill, we used Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 
2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001) and set all the individual-level variables equal to their overall 
sample means (see Table 1). For the aggregate-level variables we used each country's specific values, 
that is the government share, per capita GDP and coefficient on country dummy variable for, 
respectively, Sweden and Indonesia. Note that we were also concerned to test the robustness of these 
findings, given the recent argument of Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) that education might be 
influencing respondents’ attitudes towards trade directly (by providing them with ideas and information 
relevant to the trade policy debate) rather than via its effects on labour market outcomes. We thus made 
use of two questions, which asked respondents to identify their country’s foreign minister, and the five 
permanent UN Security Council members. From these we generated two ‘political sophistication’ 
variables, which were included in regressions not reported here (these variables were included both 
linearly and in interaction form with per capita GDP). Our Heckscher-Ohlin results are robust to the 
inclusion of these variables.   16
aversion, but other variables such as household living standards (current and future) 
and political ideology, and so we include these variables in equation (3). Controlling 
for household income, for whether respondents are worried about their work situation, 
and for ideology (how politically right wing the respondent reports himself or herself 
to be), we find that the more a respondent agrees with the statement that “The 
government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either has a job or is 
provided with adequate social welfare,” the more likely he or she is to be 
protectionist. As we argued earlier, since we are controlling for both ideology and 
current and future income, this partial correlation between pro-safety net beliefs and 
protectionism suggests that there is a positive correlation between risk aversion and 
attitudes towards trade. 
  This partial correlation in equation (3) is positive, and strongly statistically 
significant. Our interpretation of this result is that respondents who are more risk-
averse tend to be anti-globalization, although we stress that this is a partial correlation 
and that we are not making strong statements about causation.  Again, this is a robust 
result since it shows up in our other specifications as well (equations 4 and 7). It is 
economically as well as statistically significant in that, based on regression (3), Table 
3, an increase in ‘Pro-safety net’ from 3 to 5 raises the probability of being extremely 
protectionist by 12 percentage points.
9 Interestingly enough, household living 
standards have no direct impact on attitudes towards trade, according to these results, 
in that the coefficient is statistically insignificant (and indeed its sign is ambiguous). 
Being politically right-wing is associated with more protectionist sentiments in 
equation (3), but this result is not robust, since the coefficient on politically right wing 
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero in equations (4), (7) and (8). 
                                     
9 To calculate the marginal effect of ‘Pro-safety net’, we used Clarify and set all the right-hand-side 
variables (except for ‘Pro-safety net’) equal to their overall sample means (see Table 1).   17
  It is probably not surprising that respondents who are more risk-averse are 
more opposed to globalization. More interesting from the point of view of policy 
makers is whether or not they can do anything about the hostility towards 
globalization arising from this channel. Equation (4) suggests that in fact they can do 
something. Equation (4) interacts our pro-safety net variable – as well as the other 
determinants of pro-safety net attitudes – with the size of government, here measured 
by the share of government final consumption expenditure in GDP.
10 The interaction 
term is negative and statistically significant, and again this result is robust to the 
inclusion of additional variables in equation (7).  What the result is telling us is that in 
countries with bigger governments, risk aversion has a smaller impact on protectionist 
attitudes than in countries with small governments. This could be for a number of 
reasons, as mentioned in the introduction. It could be because larger governments do 
better at providing social insurance programmes of the sort which our pro-safety net 
question refers to. Or, it could be that having a big government by itself reduces the 
risk environment facing economic agents, as argued by Rodrik (1998). Our results 
show that bigger governments considerably reduce the impact of risk-aversion on 
globalization preferences. Based on regression (7), Table 3, if ‘Pro-safety net’ 
increases from 3 to 5, then the probability of being extremely protectionist increases 
by approximately 6.5 percentage points in Sweden, where the government consumes 
26.6% of GDP, but by approximately 16 percentage points in Indonesia where the 
share is only 6.5% (these two countries correspond to, respectively, the highest and 
lowest government shares in the data set).
11 
                                     
10 Notice that, in an individual-level analysis such as ours, reverse causality from attitudes to policy 
outcomes (for example, government size) is not an issue, since each individual has an infinitesimal 
impact on the aggregate policy outcome. 
11 To calculate the marginal effects of ‘Pro-safety net’, we used Clarify and set all the individual-level 
variables (except for pro-safety net) equal to their overall sample means (see Table 1). For the   18
We also tested the robustness of our results by estimating country-specific 
regressions. For each country, we ran a probit model of protectionist attitudes on age, 
gender, schooling, pro-safety net, as well as the other determinants of pro-safety net 
attitudes. As Figure 1 shows, the country-specific marginal effect of pro-safety net is 
negatively related to each country’s share of government expenditure in GDP. 
  Another way of extracting information on risk-aversion from the pro-safety 
net variable, and excluding other factors that might influence it, is to regress ‘Pro-
safety net’ on household income and political ideology, and enter the residuals from 
this regression as a regressor into our bivariate probit analysis. Equation (1) in Table 4 
provides an OLS estimate of the determinants of pro-safety net, including as 
regressors not just income and ideology, but all the other right hand side variables 
appearing in equation (3) of Table 3 as well. Though we are mainly interested in the 
residuals, the results of this analysis are interesting in themselves. Household living 
standards, not worried about job and politically right-wing are all strongly and 
negatively correlated with pro-safety net opinions, consistent with the analysis in 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2004). It is also noticeable that there is a Heckscher-Ohlin 
style relationship between schooling and ‘Pro-safety net’ –  with the educated 
favouring safety nets in poor countries but not in rich ones. This result is important 
because it is consistent with the interpretation in our previous work (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005, O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001) that the estimated impact of skill on 
protectionist attitudes (positive and negative in, respectively, low-income and high-
income countries) is related to the income-distribution Stolper-Samuelson effect of 
trade liberalization. 
                                                                                                    
aggregate-level variables we used each country's specific values, that is the government share, per 
capita GDP and coefficient on country dummy variable for, respectively, Sweden and Indonesia.   19
  The residuals from this relationship (equation 1, Table 4), which are a measure 
of risk aversion, are then entered into the bivariate probit analysis of attitudes towards 
trade (equations (5) and (6)). The results are consistent with what we found earlier: 
risk-aversion is associated with anti-trade attitudes, but this correlation diminishes as 
government size increases, consistent with the main argument of this paper.
12 
  Finally, we explore whether these results are robust to the inclusion of 
variables measuring non-economic attitudes. The answer is that they are, but our 
results for national and supranational identity are interesting in their own right as well. 
Consistent with our previous findings, nationalist sentiment (in this case measured by 
the degree of importance people ascribe to their national identity) is strongly 
associated with protectionist attitudes. On the other hand, when we turn to the impact 
of a sense of suprational identity, we find that a sense of European identity is strongly 
associated with more liberal attitudes towards trade. Thus, in terms of our earlier 
discussion, there is no evidence that identification with Europe (as in thinking of 
oneself as European) is associated with ‘Fortress Europe’ opinions; rather, quite the 
opposite, as our Euro-identifiers tend to be pro-globalization. By contrast, two of the 
remaining three supranational identities contribute to anti-globalization sentiment: 
respondents who reported having a sense of Asian identity or a sense of supranational 
Islamic identity were more anti-trade than others.  
  Equation (7) in Table 3 introduces these identity variables into a specification 
where ‘pro-safety net’ is entered directly into the equation, along with household 
income and political ideology. Equation (8) replicates the analysis, but this time 
                                     
12  We worried that the impact of government size on the coefficient of risk aversion might be driven by 
the positive correlation between government size and per capita GDP levels across countries. For 
example, maybe in advanced countries more risk-averse individuals might be less opposed to free trade 
because markets work better than in lower-income countries, therefore making it easier to insure 
against risk. We do not find evidence of this channel: When in regression (6), Table 3, we replace the 
interaction term risk aversion*govt.share with the new interaction variable risk aversion*gdp, the 
coefficient on the latter variable is not significant (results not shown).   20
adopts the two-equation approach of equations (5) and (6). In order to be consistent, 
we estimate a new first-stage OLS regression explaining ‘pro-safety net’, adding the 
identity variables as additional explanatory factors (equation (2) in Table 4). 
Interestingly, while those having an Asian or a Chinese sense of identity are more pro-
safety net, the same is not true of those with a European sense of identity, rhetoric 
about the ‘European social model’ notwithstanding. Moreover, respondents with a 
sense of supranational Islamic identity were less pro-safety net than others. Most 
importantly for our purposes, when the residuals from this equation are added into the 




  Our results provide microeconomic evidence consistent with the long-standing 
argument that the state and the market are in fact complementary. Openness and 
globalization can introduce uncertainty into peoples’ lives, and this additional risk can 
lead some people to oppose trade. Government expenditure can help to reduce this 
risk, and thus shore up support for open markets. It would seem that the ‘grand 
bargain’ that was embedded liberalism is politically effective. Whether that grand 
bargain can survive the additional political pressures which the interaction of mass 
migration and the welfare state can give rise to will be one of the key issues 
determining the sustainability of this institutional compromise in the decades ahead.   21
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 Extremely protectionist 12013 0.1899 0.3922 0 1
Age 12013 41.9245 15.4430 18 79
Female 12013 0.4709 0.4992 0 1
Years of schooling 12013 11.2232 3.9915 0 24
Pro-safety net 12013 4.2703 0.8359 1 5
Household living standards 12013 2.9385 0.7283 1 5
Not worried about job 12013 2.1811 0.7930 1 3
Politically right-wing 12013 5.4939 2.1198 1 10
Risk aversion 12013 0.0000 0.8037 -3.5599 1.4073
Risk aversion (2) 12013 0.0000 0.8022 -3.5963 1.4574
Strong national identity 12013 3.2103 1.1105 0 4
European identity 12013 0.3525 0.4778 0 1
Asian identity 12013 0.2238 0.4168 0 1
Chinese identity 12013 0.0218 0.1461 0 1
Islamic identity 12013 0.0589 0.2355 0 1
Per capita GDP (=gdp*1,000) 12013 16525.8300 7226.9150 3415.2800 26322.4800
Govt. share 12013 16.2357 4.9911 6.5320 26.5807
Table 1. Summary statistics, overall sample
These summary statistics are based on the same observations as regression (7), Table 3. Extremely protectionistequals 1 if the respondent
strongly agrees that his/her country should limit the import of foreign products. Pro-safety net ranges from 1=strongly disagree to 5= strongly
agree and gives the respondent's answer to the following question: "The government should take responsibility for ensuring that everyone either
has a job or is provided with adequate social welfare." Household living standards ranges from 1=low to 5=high. Not worried about job ranges
from 1=very worried to 3=not worried at all and gives the respondent's answer to the following question: "Some people feel that their life is going
well. Others are worried about the way it is going. In your own case, how worried are you about your work situation."
Risk aversion (risk aversion (2)) is equal to the residual from a regression of pro-safety net on age, female, years of schooling, years of
schooling*gdp, household living standards, not worried about job, politically right-wing, and country fixed effects (and national identity
variables). gdp is the 1998 per capita GDP (divided by 1000). Govt. share equals the share of government final consumption expenditure in GDP
in 2000.















Japan 0.0461 48.9725 0.5244 12.3765 4.0582 2.6524 1.9636 5.7115 1.06E-09
South Korea 0.3020 39.9594 0.4980 11.9545 4.3938 2.6505 1.7774 5.4493 -1.39E-10
China 0.1367 40.3513 0.4940 10.9611 4.3360 2.6400 2.0020
Taiwan 0.0828 40.3583 0.4870 10.2355 4.1744 2.9970 2.0875 6.3553 1.56E-09
Singapore 0.0258 39.6143 0.5020 9.8875 4.0852 3.1322 2.4695 5.8566 -3.92E-10
Malaysia 0.2180 38.3750 0.4330 9.7160 4.2758 3.0830 2.2985 6.0621 7.72E-10
Indonesia 0.2216 37.2908 0.5035 10.1005 4.4741 2.6409 2.2863 5.8921 1.70E-09
Thailand 0.2940 39.1030 0.4970 9.7963 4.2884 2.8110 2.0452 6.3907 6.05E-10
Philippines 0.3500 36.7220 0.5010 9.9130 4.3287 2.6600 1.4990 5.9514 6.74E-10
United Kingdom 0.1321 43.0493 0.5178 11.9068 4.0627 3.1440 2.5541 5.2318 2.38E-10
Ireland 0.1267 42.5010 0.5099 12.8861 4.2722 3.1149 2.6956 5.6108 4.70E-10
France 0.1869 44.6461 0.5239 13.1542 4.2102 2.9662 2.4468 4.6154 -2.93E-10
Germany 0.0556 43.9181 0.5102 10.3928 3.8032 3.1484 2.2947 5.1172 1.07E-10
Sweden 0.0879 45.5365 0.5045 11.6150 4.3835 3.0500 2.5675 5.3220 -8.90E-10
Italy 0.1939 43.0600 0.5020 11.1281 4.4985 2.9114 2.2936 5.3447 -2.41E-10
Spain 0.0997 44.5194 0.4925 10.2485 4.0566 2.9451 2.0467 4.8657 -6.23E-10
Portugal 0.2110 41.1710 0.5410 9.2372 4.4356 2.6760 2.2283 5.1035 -2.04E-10















Japan 8.88E-10 2.0115 0.0000 0.2642 0.0044 0.0000 24661.4300 16.4273
South Korea 2.00E-10 3.5168 0.0000 0.8861 0.0000 0.0000 13622.0100 12.1137
China                 2.7056 0.0000 0.3104 0.3393 0.0000 3317.7900 13.0832
Taiwan 4.79E-10 2.9541 0.0000 0.1427 0.6707 0.0000 17742.8000                
Singapore 1.08E-09 3.3559 0.0020 0.1968 0.2803 0.0726 26322.4800 11.0422
Malaysia -2.37E-11 3.6140 0.0020 0.0580 0.1670 0.4300 10191.9200 10.3947
Indonesia 7.54E-10 3.4669 0.0000 0.0989 0.0148 0.4293 3910.0200 6.5320
Thailand 5.44E-10 3.7130 0.0040 0.8190 0.0230 0.0220 6410.1700 11.3313
Philippines 7.34E-10 3.9090 0.0170 0.7510 0.0230 0.0280 3415.2800 13.0818
United Kingdom -1.36E-09 2.9260 0.2475 0.0138 0.0020 0.0049 22326.8600 18.6903
Ireland -4.09E-10 3.4475 0.4485 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 22433.9800 13.9146
France 5.02E-10 2.7893 0.7048 0.0000 0.0010 0.0109 21889.9200 23.2269
Germany 1.58E-09 2.3795 0.5387 0.0039 0.0020 0.0039 22435.1900 18.9936
Sweden 1.59E-10 2.5684 0.5944 0.0010 0.0010 0.0040 22475.3100 26.5807
Italy 7.68E-10 3.2283 0.6791 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 21915.8200 18.2847
Spain 1.41E-09 2.8504 0.7721 0.0110 0.0010 0.0000 17329.4300 17.5849
Portugal 6.13E-10 3.4540 0.7520 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 15165.2200 20.5083
Greece -1.10E-09 3.5914 0.4352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 14095.3400 15.7124
Table 2. Summary statistics, means by countryPROBIT with country dummies 12345678
Dependent variable
Age 0.0036*** 0.0038*** 0.0045*** 0.0050*** 0.0048*** 0.0053*** 0.0043*** 0.0044***
[0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011]
Female 0.0406* 0.0412* 0.0669** 0.0650** 0.0781*** 0.0776*** 0.0672** 0.0804***
[0.0232] [0.0235] [0.0278] [0.0283] [0.0278] [0.0282] [0.0284] [0.0283]
Years of schooling 0.0263*** 0.0222*** 0.0381*** 0.0381*** 0.0443*** 0.0454*** 0.0343*** 0.0404***
[0.0067] [0.0068] [0.0084] [0.0085] [0.0084] [0.0084] [0.0086] [0.0085]
Years of schooling*gdp -0.0028*** -0.0026*** -0.0039*** -0.0039*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0036*** -0.0040***
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Pro-safety net 0.2638*** 0.2687*** 0.3926*** 0.3831***
[0.0195] [0.0227] [0.0746] [0.0741]
Household living standards 0.0073 0.0268 -0.0042 -0.0028 0.0201 -0.0029
[0.0214] [0.0695] [0.0214] [0.0216] [0.0698] [0.0217]
Not worried about job -0.1370*** -0.0583 -0.1582*** -0.1642*** -0.0395 -0.1598***
[0.0197] [0.0660] [0.0197] [0.0201] [0.0661] [0.0201]
Politically right-wing 0.0214*** 0.0062 0.0157** 0.0155** 0.0143 0.01
[0.0068] [0.0246] [0.0068] [0.0069] [0.0247] [0.0070]
Pro-safety net*govt. share -0.0079* -0.0076*
[0.0044] [0.0043]
Household living standards*govt. share -0.0011 -0.0007
[0.0042] [0.0042]
Not worried about job*govt. share -0.0054 -0.0064
[0.0040] [0.0040]
Politically right-wing*govt. share 0.0009 0.0001
[0.0015] [0.0015]
Risk aversion 0.2687*** 0.3983***
[0.0227] [0.0747]
Risk aversion*govt. share -0.0083*
[0.0044]
Risk aversion (2) 0.3866***
[0.0741]
Risk aversion (2)*govt. share -0.0078*
[0.0043]
Strong national identity 0.1311*** 0.1398***
[0.0187] [0.0186]
European identity -0.1542*** -0.1525***
[0.0408] [0.0407]
Asian identity 0.1819*** 0.1979***
[0.0611] [0.0610]
Chinese identity -0.174 -0.1273
[0.1322] [0.1325]
Islamic identity 0.1613** 0.1377*
[0.0771] [0.0774]
Observations 18074 17764 12487 12018 12487 12018 12013 12013
Log likelihod -7596.18 -7357.5 -5303.01 -5156.41 -5303.01 -5157.32 -5109.9 -5110.93
Wald Chi squared 1192.72 1260.83 1042.46 1023.18 1042.46 1026.63 1053.05 1057.61
Degrees of freedom 21 22 24 27 24 24 32 29
Extremely Protectionist
Table 3. Probit regression results
The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the constant is not shown). Robust standard errors in brackets. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. See






Years of schooling 0.0230*** 0.0203***
[0.0045] [0.0045]
Years of schooling*gdp -0.0017*** -0.0015***
[0.0003] [0.0003]
Household living standards -0.0431*** -0.0457***
[0.0110] [0.0110]
Not worried about job -0.0789*** -0.0789***
[0.0103] [0.0103]
Politically right-wing -0.0216*** -0.0236***
[0.0036] [0.0036]














Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4. First stage regressions
The regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. See end
of Table 1 for definitions of variables.
Pro-Safety Net 
Figure 1: The country-specific impact of pro-safety net on protectionist attitudes, as a 
function of the government share
For each country, we have run a probit model of protectionist attitudes on age, gender, schooling, pro-safety net,
as well as the other determinants of pro-safety net attitudes. The values on the y axis in the Figure are the
marginal effects of pro-safety net from each country-specific probit model. The values on the x axis are each
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